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Abstract		Language	processing	is	not	an	isolated	capacity,	but	is	embedded	in	other	aspects	of	our	cognition.	 However,	 it	 is	 still	 largely	 unexplored	 to	 what	 extent	 and	 how	 language	processing	interacts	with	general	cognitive	resources.	This	question	can	be	investigated	with	 cognitively	 constrained	 computational	 models,	 which	 simulate	 the	 cognitive	processes	 involved	 in	 language	 processing.	 The	 theoretical	 claims	 implemented	 in	cognitive	 models	 interact	 with	 general	 architectural	 constraints	 such	 as	 memory	limitations.	This	way,	they	generate	new	predictions	that	can	be	tested	in	experiments,	thus	 generating	 new	 data	 that	 can	 give	 rise	 to	 new	 theoretical	 insights.	 This	 theory–model–experiment	 cycle	 is	 a	 promising	 method	 for	 investigating	 aspects	 of	 language	processing	 that	 are	 difficult	 to	 investigate	 with	 more	 traditional	 experimental	techniques.		 This	 review	 specifically	 examines	 the	 language	 processing	 models	 of	 Lewis	 and	Vasishth	(2005),	Reitter,	Keller,	and	Moore	(2011),	and	Van	Rij,	Van	Rijn,	and	Hendriks	(2010),	 all	 implemented	 in	 the	 cognitive	 architecture	 ACT–R	 (Anderson	 et	 al.,	 2004).	These	models	are	all	limited	by	the	assumptions	about	cognitive	capacities	provided	by	the	cognitive	architecture,	but	use	different	linguistic	approaches.	Because	of	this,	their	comparison	 provides	 insight	 into	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 assumptions	 about	 general	cognitive	resources	influence	concretely	implemented	models	of	linguistic	competence.	For	example,	 the	sheer	speed	and	accuracy	of	human	 language	processing	 is	a	current	challenge	 in	the	 field	of	cognitive	modeling,	as	 it	does	not	seem	to	adhere	to	the	same	memory	 and	processing	 capacities	 that	 have	 been	 found	 in	 other	 cognitive	 processes.	Architecture–based	 cognitive	 models	 of	 language	 processing	 may	 be	 able	 to	 make	explicit	which	 language–specific	 resources	 are	 needed	 to	 acquire	 and	 process	 natural	language.		 The	 review	 sheds	 light	 on	 cognitively	 constrained	 models	 of	 language	 processing	from	two	angles:	we	discuss	1)	whether	currently	adopted	cognitive	assumptions	meet	the	requirements	for	language	processing,	and	2)	how	cognitive	assumptions	reduce	the	degrees	 of	 freedom	 of	 linguistic	 analyses,	 thus	 increasing	 their	 cognitive	 plausibility.	Overall,	 the	 evaluation	 of	 cognitively	 constrained	 models	 of	 language	 processing	 will	allow	 for	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 relation	 between	 data,	 linguistic	 theory,	cognitive	assumptions,	and	explanation.		 	
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2	2.1 Introduction		Language	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 remarkable	 capacities	 of	 the	 human	 mind.	 Arguably,	language	 is	 not	 an	 isolated	 capacity	 of	 the	mind,	 but	 is	 embedded	 in	 other	 aspects	 of	cognition.	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 in,	 for	 example,	 linguistic	 recursion.	 Although	 linguistic	recursion	 (e.g.,	 ‘the	 sister	 of	 the	 father	of	 the	 cousin	of...’)	 could	 in	principle	be	applied	infinitely	many	times,	if	the	construction	becomes	too	complex	we	will	lose	track	of	its	meaning	 due	 to	memory	 constraints	 (Fedorenko,	Woodbury,	 &	 Gibson,	 2013;	 Gibson,	2000).	 Even	 though	 there	 are	 ample	 examples	 of	 cognitive	 resources	 like	 memory	playing	 a	 role	 in	 language	 processing	 (Christiansen	 &	 Chater,	 2016;	 Huettig	 &	 Janse,	2016;	King	&	Just,	1991),	it	is	still	largely	unexplored	to	what	extent	language	processing	and	general	cognitive	resources	interact.	That	is,	which	general	cognitive	resources	and	which	 language	 processing–specific	 resources	 are	 used	 for	 language	 processing?	 For	example,	is	language	processing	supported	by	the	same	memory	system	that	is	used	in	other	 cognitive	 processes?	 In	 this	 review,	 we	 will	 investigate	 to	 what	 extent	 general	cognitive	resources	limit	and	influence	models	of	linguistic	competence.	To	this	end,	we	will	 review	 cognitively	 constrained	 computational	 models	 of	 language	 processing	implemented	 in	 the	 cognitive	 architecture	ACT–R,	 and	evaluate	how	general	 cognitive	limitations	 influence	 linguistic	 processing	 in	 these	 models.	 These	 computational	cognitive	models	 explicitly	 implement	 theoretical	 claims,	 for	 example	 about	 language,	based	on	empirical	observations	or	experimental	data.	The	evaluation	of	 these	models	will	 generate	new	 insights	about	 the	 interplay	between	 language	and	other	aspects	of	cognition.			 Memory	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 general	 cognitive	 principles	 for	 language	processing.	 In	 sentence	 processing,	 words	 have	 to	 be	 processed	 rapidly,	 because	otherwise	 the	 memory	 of	 the	 preceding	 context,	 necessary	 for	 understanding	 the	complete	 sentence,	will	 be	 lost	 (Christiansen	&	Chater,	 2016).	 Evidence	 that	 language	processing	shares	a	memory	system	with	other	cognitive	processes	can	be	found	in	the	relation	 between	 general	 working	 memory	 tests	 and	 linguistic	 tests.	 For	 example,	individual	 differences	 in	working	memory	 capacity	 have	 been	 found	 to	 play	 a	 role	 in	syntactic	 processing	 (King	 &	 Just,	 1991),	 predictive	 language	 processing	 (Huettig	 &	Janse,	 2016),	 recursive	 syntax	 comprehension	 (Arslan,	 Hohenberger,	 &	 Verbrugge,	2017),	 and	 discourse	 production	 (Kuijper,	 Hartman,	 &	 Hendriks,	 2015).	 Besides	memory,	 other	 factors	 like	 attentional	 focus	 (Lewis,	 Vasishth,	&	Van	Dyke,	 2006)	 and	processing	speed	(Hendriks,	Van	Rijn,	&	Valkenier,	2007)	have	been	argued	to	influence	linguistic	 performance.	 Thus,	 it	 seems	 apparent	 that	 language	 processing	 is	 not	 an	isolated	capacity,	but	is	embedded	in	other	aspects	of	cognition.	This	claim	conflicts	with	the	 traditional	 view	 that	 language	 is	 a	 specialized	 faculty	 (cf.	 Chomsky,	 1980;	 Fodor,	1983).	It	is	therefore	important	to	note	that	computational	cognitive	models	can	be	used	to	 investigate	 both	 viewpoints,	 i.e.	 to	 investigate	 to	 what	 extent	 general	 cognitive	resources	 can	 be	 used	 in	 language	 processing,	 but	 also	 to	 investigate	 to	 what	 extent	language	is	a	specialized	process.	It	has	also	been	argued	that	language	processing	is	a	specialized	 process	 that	 is	 nevertheless	 influenced	 by	 a	 range	 of	 general	 cognitive	
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resources	(Lewis,	1996;	Newell,	1990).	Therefore,	we	argue	that	the	potential	influence	and	 limitations	 of	 general	 cognitive	 resources	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 when	studying	theories	of	language	processing.		 To	be	able	to	account	for	the	processing	limitations	imposed	by	a	scarcity	of	cognitive	resources,	theories	of	language	need	to	be	specified	as	explicitly	as	possible	with	regards	to,	 for	example,	processing	steps,	 the	 incrementality	of	processing,	memory	retrievals,	and	 representations.	 This	 allows	 for	 a	 specification	 of	 what	 belongs	 to	 linguistic	competence	and	what	belongs	to	linguistic	performance	(Chomsky,	1965):	Competence	is	 the	 knowledge	 a	 language	 user	 has,	 whereas	 performance	 is	 the	 output	 that	 a	language	user	produces,	which	results	from	his	competence	in	combination	with	other	(cognitive)	 factors	 (see	 Figure	 2.1	 for	 examples).	 Many	 linguistic	 theories	 have	 been	argued	 to	 be	 theories	 of	 linguistic	 competence	 that	 abstract	 away	 from	 details	 of	linguistic	 performance	 (Fromkin,	 2000).	 However,	 these	 theories	 rarely	make	 explicit	how	the	step	from	competence	to	performance	is	made.	In	order	to	create	a	distinction	between	competence	and	performance,	an	increasing	emphasis	is	placed	on	grounding	linguistic	theories	empirically	by	creating	the	step	from	an	abstract	theory	to	concrete,	testable	predictions	(Baayen,	Dijkstra,	&	Schreuder,	1997;	Kempen	&	Hoenkamp,	1987;	Reitter,	Keller,	&	Moore,	2011;	Roelofs,	1992).	Formalizing	language	processing	theories	explicitly	 thus	means	 that	 the	distinction	between	 linguistic	competence	and	 linguistic	performance	 can	 be	 explained,	 and	 makes	 it	 possible	 to	 examine	 which	 cognitive	resources,	according	to	a	language	processing	theory,	are	needed	to	process	language.		 The	 importance	 of	 explicitly	 specified	 linguistic	 theories	 that	 distinguish	 between	competence	and	performance	can	be	seen	 in	 the	acquisition	of	verbs.	Children	show	a	U–shaped	 learning	curve	 (see	Pauls,	Macha,	&	Petermann,	2013	 for	an	overview;	a	U–shaped	 learning	 curve	 is	 depicted	 in	 Figure	 2.1)	 when	 learning	 past	 tenses	 of	 verbs,	using	 the	 correct	 irregular	 form	 first	 (e.g.,	 the	 past	 tense	 ate	 for	 eat),	 then	 using	 the	incorrect	regular	form	of	irregular	verbs	(e.g.,	eated),	before	using	the	correct	irregular	form	 again.	 It	 is	 conceivable	 that	 whereas	 children’s	 performance	 initially	 decreases,	children	are	in	the	process	of	learning	how	to	correctly	form	regular	and	irregular	past	tenses	and	therefore	have	increasing	competence	(cf.	Taatgen	&	Anderson,	2002).	In	this	example,	explicitly	specifying	the	processing	that	is	needed	to	form	verb	tenses	and	how	this	 processing	 uses	 general	 cognitive	 resources	 could	 explain	 why	 children’s	performance	 does	 not	 match	 their	 competence.	 Another	 example	 of	 performance	deviating	 from	 competence	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 comprehension	 and	 production	 of	pronouns:	 whereas	 6–year–old	 children	 generally	 produce	 pronouns	 correctly	 (they	have	the	competence,	see	Spenader,	Smits,	&	Hendriks,	2009),	they	often	make	mistakes	in	pronoun	interpretation	(they	show	reduced	performance,	Chien	&	Wexler,	1990).		 	
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Figure	 2.1.	The	 above	 graphs	 show	 four	 possible	 relationships	 between	 competence,	cognition	and	performance.	Performance	is	 influenced	by	competence	and	cognition.	If	someone’s	 performance	 (black	 solid	 line)	 increases	 over	 age,	 this	 could	 be	due	 to	 the	competence	(red	dashed	line)	increasing	(as	displayed	in	the	upper	left	graph),	or	due	to	cognition	 (shaded	 area)	 increasing,	while	 competence	 stays	 constant	 (as	 displayed	 in	the	upper	right	graph).	Cognitive	limitations	can	prevent	performance	from	reaching	full	competence	(lower	left	graph).	Competence	and	cognition	can	also	both	change	over	age	and	 influence	 performance.	 The	 lower	 right	 graph	 shows	 the	 classical	 performance	curve	 of	 U–shaped	 learning,	 in	 which	 performance	 initially	 decreases	 even	 though	competence	 is	 increasing.	 The	 graphs	 are	 a	 simplification,	 as	 factors	 other	 than	competence	and	cognition	could	also	influence	performance,	for	example	motor	skills.		Especially	when	different	 linguistic	 theories	 have	 been	put	 forward	 to	 explain	 similar	phenomena,	 it	 is	 important	to	be	able	to	compare	and	test	the	theories	on	the	basis	of	concrete	 predictions.	 Linguistic	 theories	 are	 often	 postulated	 without	 considering	cognitive	 resources.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 investigate	 how	well	 these	 theories	perform	under	realistic	cognitive	constraints;	this	will	provide	information	about	their	cognitive	 plausibility.	 Cognitively	 constrained	 computational	 models	 (from	 now	 on:	cognitive	 models)	 are	 a	 useful	 tool	 to	 compare	 linguistic	 theories	 while	 taking	 into	account	the	limitations	imposed	by	a	scarcity	of	cognitive	resources,	and	can	be	used	to	investigate	 the	 relation	 between	 underlying	 linguistic	 competence	 and	 explicit	predictions	 about	 performance.	 Thus,	 by	 implementing	 a	 linguistic	 theory	 into	 a	cognitive	model,	language	processing	is	embedded	in	other	aspects	of	cognition,	and	the	extent	 can	 be	 investigated	 to	 which	 assumptions	 about	 general	 cognitive	 resources	influence	models	of	linguistic	competence.			 A	 cognitive	 model	 can	 generate	 new	 predictions	 that	 can	 be	 tested	 in	 further	experiments,	 generating	 new	 data	 that	 can	 give	 rise	 to	 new	 implementations.	 This	
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theory–model–experiment	 cycle	 is	 a	 promising	 method	 for	 investigating	 aspects	 of	language	 processing	 that	 are	 difficult	 to	 investigate	 with	 standard	 experimental	techniques,	which	 usually	 provide	 insight	 into	 performance	 (e.g.,	 behavior,	 responses,	response	 times),	 but	 not	 competence.	 Cognitive	 models	 require	 linguistic	 theories,	which	usually	describe	competence,	to	be	explicitly	specified.	This	way,	the	performance	of	competing	linguistic	theories,	which	often	have	different	approaches	to	the	structure	and	interpretation	of	language,	can	be	investigated	using	cognitive	models.	Contrary	to	other	computational	modeling	methods,	 cognitive	models	simulate	 the	processing	of	a	single	 individual.	 Because	 of	 this,	 it	 can	 be	 investigated	 how	 individual	 variations	 in	cognitive	 resources	 (which	 can	 be	 manipulated	 in	 a	 model)	 influence	 a	 linguistic	theory’s	performance.		 The	comparison	of	cognitive	models	that	use	different	 linguistic	approaches	is	most	straightforward	 when	 they	 make	 use	 of	 the	 same	 assumptions	 about	 cognitive	resources,	 and	 thus	 are	 implemented	 in	 the	 same	 cognitive	 architecture.	 This	 review	will	 therefore	 focus	 on	 cognitive	 models	 developed	 in	 the	 same	 domain–general	cognitive	architecture,	ACT–R	(Adaptive	Control	of	Thought	–	Rational;	Anderson	et	al.,	2004).	 There	 are	 several	 other	 cognitive	 architectures	 available	 (e.g.,	 EPIC:	 Kieras	 &	Meyer,	 1997;	 NENGO:	 Stewart,	 Tripp,	 &	 Eliasmith,	 2009),	 but	 in	 order	 to	 keep	 the	assumptions	 about	 general	 cognitive	 resources	 roughly	 constant	 this	 review	will	 only	consider	 models	 implemented	 in	 ACT–R.	 Over	 the	 past	 years,	 several	 linguistic	phenomena	have	been	implemented	 in	ACT–R,	such	as	metaphors	(Budiu	&	Anderson,	2002),	agrammatism	(Stocco	&	Crescentini,	2005),	pronominal	binding	(Hendriks	et	al.,	2007)	and	presupposition	resolution	(Brasoveanu	&	Dotlačil,	2015).	In	order	to	obtain	a	broad	 view	 of	 cognitively	 constrained	 models	 of	 linguistic	 theories,	 we	 will	 examine	three	models	of	different	linguistic	modalities	(comprehension,	production,	perspective	taking),	 that	 all	 take	 a	different	 linguistic	 approach,	 in	depth:	 the	 syntactic	processing	model	of	Lewis	and	Vasishth	(2005),	the	syntactic	priming	model	of	Reitter	et	al.	(2011),	and	 the	 pronoun	 processing	model	 of	 Van	 Rij,	 Van	 Rijn,	 and	 Hendriks	 (2010).	 These	models	are	all	bounded	by	the	same	assumptions	about	cognitive	capacities	provided	by	the	 cognitive	 architecture	 ACT–R,	 which	 makes	 them	 optimally	 comparable.	 Their	comparison	 will	 provide	 insight	 into	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 assumptions	 about	 general	cognitive	resources	influence	models	of	linguistic	competence.		 This	chapter	is	organized	as	follows.	First,	we	will	discuss	the	components	of	ACT–R	that	 are	 most	 relevant	 in	 our	 discussion	 of	 language	 processing	 models,	 in	 order	 to	explain	how	cognitive	resources	play	a	role	in	this	architecture.	Then,	we	will	outline	the	different	 linguistic	approaches	that	are	used	in	the	models.	Finally,	we	will	discuss	the	selected	 ACT–R	models	 of	 language	 processing	 in	more	 detail.	 Importantly,	 it	 will	 be	examined	 how	 general	 cognitive	 resources	 are	 used	 in	 the	 models,	 and	 how	 these	cognitive	resources	and	linguistic	principles	interact.		
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2	2.2 Basic	ACT–R	components		ACT–R	 (Anderson,	 1993,	 2007;	 Anderson	 et	 al.,	 2004)	 is	 a	 cognitive	 architecture	 in	which	 models	 can	 be	 implemented	 to	 simulate	 a	 certain	 process	 or	 collection	 of	processes.	 Of	 specific	 interest	 for	 this	 review	 is	 the	 simulation	 of	 language–related	processes,	such	as	interpreting	or	producing	a	sentence.	Cognitive	models	in	ACT–R	are	restricted	 by	 general	 cognitive	 resources	 and	 constraints	 embedded	 in	 the	 ACT–R	architecture.	 Examples	 of	 such	 cognitive	 resources	 that	 are	 of	 importance	 when	modeling	 language	 are	 memory,	 processing	 speed,	 and	 attention.	 By	 implementing	 a	model	of	a	 linguistic	theory	in	ACT–R,	one	can	thus	examine	how	this	 linguistic	theory	behaves	in	interaction	with	other	aspects	of	cognition.			 ACT–R	aims	to	explain	human	cognition	as	the	interaction	between	a	set	of	functional	modules.	Each	module	has	a	specific	 function,	such	as	perception,	action,	memory	and	executive	function	(see	Anderson	et	al.,	2004	for	an	overview).	Modules	can	be	accessed	by	the	model	through	buffers.	The	information	in	these	buffers	represents	information	that	 is	 in	 the	 focus	of	attention.	Only	 the	 information	 that	 is	 in	a	buffer	can	be	readily	used	by	the	model.	An	overview	of	the	standard	ACT–R	modules	and	buffers	is	shown	in	Figure	2.2.	The	modules	most	relevant	for	language	processing,	the	declarative	memory	module	and	the	procedural	memory	module,	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	below.	
	
Figure	 2.2.	 An	 overview	 of	 the	 standard	 modules	 and	 buffers	 in	 ACT–R	 (based	 on	Anderson	et	al.,	2004).	
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The	 declarative	 memory	 stores	 factual	 information	 as	 chunks.	 Chunks	 are	 pieces	 of	knowledge	that	can	store	multiple	properties,	such	as	that	there	is	a	cat	with	the	name	‘Coco’,	whose	color	is	‘gray’.	The	information	in	a	chunk	can	only	be	used	after	the	chunk	has	 been	 retrieved	 from	 the	 declarative	 memory	 and	 has	 been	 placed	 in	 the	corresponding	 retrieval	 buffer.	 In	 order	 to	 retrieve	 information	 from	 memory,	 a	retrieval	 request	 must	 be	 made.	 Only	 chunks	 with	 an	 activation	 that	 exceeds	 a	predetermined	 activation	 threshold	 can	 be	 retrieved.	 The	 higher	 the	 activation	 of	 a	chunk,	 the	 more	 likely	 it	 is	 to	 be	 retrieved.	 The	 base–level	 activation	 of	 a	 chunk	increases	when	a	chunk	is	retrieved	from	memory,	but	decays	over	time.	This	way,	the	recency	and	frequency	of	a	chunk	influence	a	chunk’s	activation,	and	thereby	its	chance	of	recall	and	its	retrieval	time	(in	line	with	experimental	findings,	e.g.,	(Allen	&	Hulme,	2006;	Anderson	&	Schooler,	1991;	Deese	&	Kaufman,	1957).	Additionally,	 information	that	 is	 currently	 in	 the	 focus	of	 attention	 (i.e.	 in	a	buffer)	 can	 increase	 the	probability	that	 associated	 chunks	 are	 recalled	by	 adding	 spreading	 activation	 to	 a	 chunk’s	base–level	 activation.	 The	 activation	 of	 chunks	 can	 additionally	 be	 influenced	 by	 noise,	occasionally	causing	a	chunk	with	less	activation	to	be	retrieved	over	a	chunk	with	more	activation.			 Whereas	 the	 declarative	 memory	 represents	 factual	 knowledge,	 the	 procedural	memory	represents	knowledge	about	how	to	perform	actions.	The	procedural	memory	consists	of	production	rules,	which	have	an	 if–then	structure.	An	example	of	 the	basic	structure	of	a	production	rule	is	as	follows:			 		 IF			 	 a	new	word	is	attended			 THEN		 	 retrieve	lexical	information	about	this	word	from	memory		The	THEN–part	of	a	production	rule	is	executed	when	the	IF–part	matches	the	current	buffer	contents.	Production	rules	are	executed	one	by	one.	 If	 the	conditions	of	 several	production	rules	are	met,	the	one	with	the	highest	utility	is	selected.	This	utility	reflects	the	usefulness	the	rule	has	had	in	the	past,	and	can	be	used	to	learn	from	feedback,	both	positively	and	negatively	 (for	more	detail	 on	utilities,	 see	Anderson	et	 al.,	 2004).	New	production	rules	can	be	learned	on	the	basis	of	existing	rules	and	declarative	knowledge	(production	compilation,	Taatgen	&	Anderson,	2002).		 Several	 general	 cognitive	 resources	 and	 further	 resources	 that	 are	 important	 for	language	processing	are	incorporated	in	the	ACT–R	architecture,	such	as	memory,	speed	of	processing,	and	attention.	Long–term	memory	corresponds	to	the	declarative	module	in	ACT–R.	Short–term	or	working	memory	is	not	incorporated	as	a	separate	component	in	ACT–R	(Borst,	Taatgen,	&	Van	Rijn,	2010),	but	emanates	from	the	interaction	between	the	buffers	 and	 the	declarative	memory.	Daily,	 Lovett,	 and	Reder	 (2001)	propose	 that	the	 function	 of	 working	 memory	 can	 be	 simulated	 in	 ACT–R	 by	 associating	 relevant	information	with	 information	that	 is	currently	 in	 focus	(through	spreading	activation).	
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2	Thus,	working	memory	 capacity	 can	 change	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 change	 in	 the	 amount	 of	spreading	activation	in	a	model.		 All	 above–mentioned	 operations	 take	 time.	 The	 retrieval	 of	 information	 from	declarative	memory	is	faster	and	more	likely	to	succeed	if	a	chunk	has	a	high	activation	(for	details	see	Anderson	et	al.,	2004).	Because	a	chunk’s	activation	increases	when	it	is	retrieved,	 chunks	 that	 have	 been	 retrieved	 often	 will	 have	 a	 high	 activation	 and	 will	therefore	be	retrieved	more	quickly.	Additionally,	all	processing	 in	ACT–R	 is	serial,	 i.e.	only	one	retrieval	from	declarative	memory	and	only	one	production	rule	execution	can	be	done	at	any	point	in	time	(serial	processing	bottleneck,	Anderson,	2007).	Production	rules	in	ACT–R	take	a	standard	amount	of	time	to	fire	(50ms).	Rules	that	are	often	used	in	succession	can	merge	into	a	new	production	rule.	These	new	rules	are	a	combination	of	the	old	rules	that	were	previously	fired	in	sequence,	making	the	model	more	efficient.	Thus,	 increasing	 activation	 and	 production	 compilation	 allow	 a	 model’s	 processing	speed	to	increase	through	practice	and	experience.		 As	 described,	 memory	 and	 processing	 speed	 are	 examples	 of	 general	 cognitive	principles	 in	 ACT–R,	 that	will	 be	 important	when	 implementing	models	 that	 perform	language	processing.	 In	 the	next	section,	 three	 linguistic	approaches	will	be	discussed.	These	approaches	are	relevant	for	the	three	cognitive	models	reviewed	in	the	remainder	of	the	chapter.		
2.3 Linguistic	approaches		Cognitive	models	can	be	used	to	implement	any	linguistic	approach,	and	as	such	are	not	bound	to	one	method	or	theory.	In	principle	any	of	the	theories	that	have	been	proposed	in	 linguistics	 to	 account	 for	 a	 speaker’s	 linguistic	 competence,	 such	 as	 Combinatorial	Categorial	 Grammar	 (Steedman,	 1988),	 Construction	 Grammar	 (Fillmore,	 Kay,	 &	O’Connor,	 1988),	 generative	 syntax	 (Chomsky,	 1970),	 Head–driven	 Phrase	 Structure	Grammar	 (Pollard	 &	 Sag,	 1994),	 Lexical	 Functional	 Grammar	 (Bresnan,	 2001),	Optimality	Theory	(Prince	&	Smolensky,	1993),	Tree–Adjoining	Grammar	(Joshi,	Levy,	&	Takahashi,	 1975),	 and	 Usage–based	 Grammar	 (Bybee	 &	 Beckner,	 2009)	 could	 be	implemented	 in	 a	 cognitive	 model.	 These	 linguistic	 approaches	 tend	 to	 entertain	different	 assumptions,	 for	 example	 about	 what	 linguistic	 knowledge	 looks	 like	(universal	 principles,	 violable	 constraints,	 structured	 lexical	 categories,	 grammatical	constructions),	the	relation	between	linguistic	forms	and	their	meanings,	and	the	levels	of	representation	needed.	
	 In	 this	 review,	 we	 will	 discuss	 three	 specific	 linguistic	 approaches	 that	 have	 been	implemented	 in	 cognitive	models,	which	 allows	 us	 to	 compare	 how	 general	 cognitive	resources	influence	the	implementation	and	output	(e.g.,	responses,	response	times)	of	these	 modeled	 linguistic	 approaches.	 The	 three	 linguistic	 approaches	 that	 will	 be	discussed	have	several	 features	in	common,	but	also	differ	 in	a	number	of	 features:	X–bar	theory	(Chomsky,	1970),	Combinatorial	Categorial	Grammar	(Steedman,	1988),	and	Optimality	Theory	(Prince	&	Smolensky,	1993).	These	 linguistic	approaches	have	been	implemented	in	the	cognitive	models	discussed	in	the	next	section.	
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	 Generative	syntax	uses	X–bar	 theory	 to	build	syntactic	structures	 (Chomsky,	1970).	X–bar	 theory	 reflects	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 syntactic	 representation	 of	 a	 clause	 is	hierarchical	 and	 can	 be	 presented	 as	 a	 binary	 branching	 tree.	 Phrases	 are	 built	 up	around	a	head,	which	is	the	principal	category.	For	example,	the	head	of	a	verb	phrase	is	the	verb,	and	the	head	of	a	prepositional	phrase	is	a	preposition.	To	the	left	or	right	of	this	head,	other	phrases	can	be	attached	in	the	hierarchical	structure.			 Combinatory	 Categorial	 Grammar	 (CCG;	 Steedman,	 1988)	 builds	 the	 syntactic	structure	 of	 a	 sentence	 in	 tandem	 with	 the	 representation	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	sentence.	 It	 is	 a	 strongly	 lexicalized	 grammar	 formalism,	 that	 proceeds	 from	 the	assumption	that	the	properties	of	the	grammar	follow	from	the	properties	of	the	words	in	 the	sentence.	That	 is,	each	word	has	a	particular	 lexical	category	 that	specifies	how	that	word	 can	 combine	with	 other	words,	 and	what	 the	 resulting	meaning	will	 be.	 In	addition,	CCG	is	surface–driven	and	reflects	the	assumption	that	 language	is	processed	and	 interpreted	 directly,	 without	 appealing	 to	 an	 underlying	 –	 invisible	 –	 level	 of	representation.	For	one	sentence,	CCG	can	produce	multiple	representations	(Reitter	et	al.,	 2011;	 Steedman,	 1988).	 This	 allows	 CCG	 to	 build	 syntactic	 representations	incrementally,	from	left	to	right.		 The	 linguistic	 framework	 of	 Optimality	 Theory	 (OT;	 Prince	 &	 Smolensky,	 1993)	reflects	 the	 assumption	 that	 language	 is	 processed	 based	 on	 constraints	 on	 possible	outputs	(words,	sentences,	meanings).	Based	on	an	input,	a	set	of	output	candidates	 is	generated.	Subsequently,	 these	potential	outputs	are	evaluated	based	on	hierarchically	ranked	 constraints;	 stronger	 constraints	 have	 priority	 over	 weaker	 constraints.	 The	optimal	 output	 is	 the	 candidate	 that	 satisfies	 the	 set	 of	 constraints	 best.	 The	 optimal	output	 may	 be	 a	 form	 (in	 language	 production)	 or	 a	 meaning	 (in	 language	comprehension).		
2.3.1 Commonalities	and	differences			X–bar	theory,	CCG,	and	OT	have	different	assumptions	about	how	language	is	structured.	X–bar	 theory	 builds	 a	 syntactic	 structure,	 whereas	 CCG	 builds	 both	 a	 syntactic	 and	 a	semantic	 representation,	 and	OT	builds	 either	 a	 syntactic	 representation	 (in	 language	production)	 or	 a	 semantic	 representation	 (in	 language	 comprehension).	 Nevertheless,	these	 theories	 can	all	be	used	 for	 the	 implementation	of	 cognitive	models	of	 language	processing.	 In	 the	 next	 section,	 three	 cognitive	models	 of	 language	 processing	will	 be	discussed	in	detail,	with	a	focus	on	how	the	linguistic	approaches	are	implemented	and	how	they	interact	with	other	aspects	of	cognition.		
2.4 Cognitive	models	of	language	processing	
	In	 the	 following	 sections,	 three	 cognitive	 language	 models	 will	 be	 described:	 the	sentence	processing	model	of	Lewis	and	Vasishth	(2005),	the	syntactic	priming	model	of	Reitter	 et	 al.	 (2011),	 and	 the	 pronoun	 processing	model	 of	 Van	 Rij	 et	 al.	 (2010).	 The	model	 of	 Lewis	 and	 Vasishth	 (2005)	 uses	 a	 parsing	 strategy	 that	 is	 based	 on	 X–bar	
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2	theory,	the	model	of	Reitter	et	al.	(2011)	uses	CCG,	and	the	model	of	Van	Rij	et	al.	(2010)	uses	 OT.	 The	models	 will	 be	 evaluated	 based	 on	 their	 predictions	 of	 novel	 empirical	outcomes	and	how	they	achieve	these	predictions	(for	example	how	many	parameters	are	 fitted,	 cf.	 Roberts	 &	 Pashler,	 2000).	 After	 describing	 the	 models	 separately,	 the	commonalities	and	differences	between	these	models	will	be	discussed.	Based	on	 this,	we	will	review	how	the	interaction	between	general	cognitive	resources	in	ACT–R	and	linguistic	principles	from	specific	linguistic	theories	can	be	fruitful	in	studying	cognitive	assumptions	of	linguistic	theories.		
2.4.1 Modeling	sentence	processing	as	skilled	memory	retrieval		The	first	model	that	we	discuss	is	the	sentence	processing	model	of	Lewis	and	Vasishth	(2005).	 This	 model	 is	 a	 seminal	 model	 forming	 the	 basis	 for	 many	 later	 language	processing	models	(a.o.,	Engelmann,	Vasishth,	Engbert,	&	Kliegl,	2013;	Jäger,	Engelmann,	&	 Vasishth,	 2015;	 Salvucci	 &	 Taatgen,	 2008).	 Lewis	 and	 Vasishth’s	 (2005)	 sentence	processing	 model	 (henceforth	 the	 L&V	 model)	 performs	 syntactic	 parsing	 based	 on	memory	principles:	When	processing	a	complete	sentence,	maintaining	the	part	of	 the	sentence	 that	 is	 already	 processed	 in	 order	 to	 integrate	 it	 with	 new	 incoming	information	 requires	 (working)	memory.	 The	 aim	 of	 the	 L&V	model	 is	 to	 investigate	how	working	memory	processes	play	a	role	in	sentence	processing.			
2.4.1.1 Theoretical	approach	The	L&V	model	uses	left–corner	parsing	(Aho	&	Ullman,	1972),	based	on	X–bar	theory	(Chomsky,	 1970),	 to	 build	 a	 syntactic	 representation	 of	 the	 sentence.	 The	 left	 corner	(LC)	parser	builds	a	syntactic	structure	of	the	input	sentence	incrementally,	and	predicts	the	upcoming	syntactic	structure	as	new	words	are	encountered.	Thus,	LC	parsing	uses	information	 from	 the	words	 in	 the	 sentence	 to	predict	what	 the	 syntactic	 structure	of	that	sentence	will	be.	In	doing	this,	LC	parsing	combines	top–down	processing,	based	on	syntactic	rules,	and	bottom–up	processing,	based	on	the	words	in	the	sentence.			 LC	parsing	is	based	on	structural	rules,	that	for	example	state	that	a	sentence	can	be	made	up	of	a	noun	phrase	and	a	verb	phrase	(a),	and	that	a	noun	phrase	can	be	made	up	of	 a	 determiner	 and	 a	 noun	 (b).	 An	 input	 (word)	 is	 nested	 under	 the	 left–hand–side	(generally	an	overarching	category)	of	a	structural	rule	if	that	rule	contains	the	input	on	its	 left	 corner.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 sentence	 the	 dog	 ran,	 the	 is	 a	 determiner	 (Det)	according	to	structural	rule	(c),	which	itself	is	on	the	left	corner	of	rule	(b)	and	thus	it	is	nested	under	an	NP.	This	NP	is	on	the	left	corner	of	rule	(a).	The	result	of	applying	these	rules	is	the	phrase–structure	tree	shown	in	Figure	2.3.			 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 (a)	S	→	NP	VP		 	 	 	 (b)	NP	→	Det	N		 	 	 	 (c)	Det	→	the		 	 	 	 (d)	N	→	dog		
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Importantly,	 the	 generated	 tree	 also	 contains	 syntactic	 categories	 that	 have	 not	 been	encountered	yet	(like	N	and	VP	in	Figure	2.3),	so	it	contains	a	prediction	of	the	upcoming	sentence	structure.	When	the	next	word,	dog,	 is	now	encountered,	 it	can	be	integrated	with	the	existing	tree	immediately	after	applying	rule	(d).		
	
Figure	2.3.	A	tree	structure	generated	by	LC	parsing	of	the	word	the	by	applying	rules	(c),	(b),	and	(a)	consecutively	(based	on	Lewis	&	Vasishth,	2005).			
2.4.1.2 Implementation	The	L&V	model	parses	a	sentence	on	the	basis	of	guided	memory	retrievals.	Declarative	memory	is	used	as	the	short–	and	long–term	memory	needed	for	sentence	processing.	The	 declarative	memory	 holds	 lexical	 information	 as	well	 as	 any	 syntactic	 structures	that	are	built	during	sentence	processing.	The	activation	of	these	chunks	is	influenced	by	the	standard	ACT–R	declarative	memory	functions,	and	so	their	activation	(and	with	this	their	retrieval	probability	and	latency)	is	influenced	by	the	recency	and	frequency	with	which	they	were	used.	Similarity–based	interference	occurs	because	the	effectiveness	of	a	 retrieval	 request	 is	 reduced	 as	 the	 number	 of	 items	 associated	 with	 the	 specific	request	increases.		 Grammatical	 knowledge,	 however,	 is	 not	 stored	 in	 the	 declarative	 memory,	 but	 is	implemented	as	procedural	knowledge	in	production	rules.	That	is,	the	knowledge	about	how	sentences	are	parsed	is	stored	in	a	large	number	of	production	rules,	which	interact	with	 the	 declarative	 memory	 when	 retrieving	 lexical	 information	 or	 constituents	(syntactic	structures).			 The	L&V	model	processes	a	sentence	word	for	word	using	the	LC	parsing	algorithm	described	in	2.4.1.1.	An	overview	of	the	model’s	processing	steps	is	shown	in	Figure	2.4.	After	a	word	is	attended	(for	example,	the	from	the	dog	ran,	Box	1),	lexical	information	about	this	word	is	retrieved	from	memory	and	stored	in	the	lexical	buffer	(Box	2).	Based	on	the	syntactic	category	of	the	word	and	the	current	state	of	the	model,	the	model	looks	for	a	prior	constituent	that	the	new	syntactic	category	could	be	attached	to	(Box	3).	In	our	example,	the	is	a	determiner	and	it	is	the	first	word,	so	a	syntactic	structure	with	a	determiner	 will	 be	 retrieved.	 The	 model	 then	 creates	 a	 new	 syntactic	 structure	 by	attaching	 the	 new	 word	 to	 the	 retrieved	 constituent	 (Box	 4).	 A	 new	 word	 is	 then	attended	(dog	in	our	example,	Box	1).	This	cycle	continues	until	no	new	words	are	left	to	attend.	
S
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@ 
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1
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Figure	2.4.	Overview	of	the	processing	steps	of	L&V’s	sentence	processing	model	(based	on	Lewis	&	Vasishth,	2005).	The	model	processes	one	word	at	a	time,	first	retrieving	its	lexical	 information	 and	 then	 retrieving	 a	 prior	 constituent	 for	 the	 new	 word	 to	 be	attached	to.		
2.4.1.3 Evaluation	Lewis	and	Vasishth	(2005)	present	several	simulation	studies,	showing	that	their	model	can	account	for	reading	times	from	experiments.	The	model	also	accounts	for	the	effects	of	 the	 length	 of	 a	 sentence	 (short	 sentences	 are	 read	 faster	 than	 long	 sentences)	 and	structural	 interference	 (high	 interference	 creates	a	bigger	delay	 in	 reading	 times	 than	low	 interference)	 on	 unambiguous	 and	 garden–path	 sentences.	 With	 a	 number	 of	additions	(that	are	outside	the	scope	of	this	review),	the	model	can	be	made	to	cope	with	gapped	 structures	 and	 embedded	 structures,	 as	well	 as	 local	 ambiguity	 (see	 Lewis	 &	Vasishth,	2005,	for	more	detail).		
Predictions	Lewis	and	Vasishth	(2005)	compared	their	output	to	existing	experiments,	rather	than	making	explicit	predictions	about	new	experiments.	The	model	does	however	provide	ideas	about	why	any	discrepancies	between	the	model	and	the	fitted	data	occur,	which	could	 be	 seen	 as	 predictions,	 although	 these	 predictions	 have	 not	 been	 tested	 in	 new	experiments.	For	example,	when	comparing	the	L&V	models’	simulated	reading	times	of	subject	 relative	 clauses	 and	 object	 relative	 clauses	 to	 data	 from	 Grodner	 and	 Gibson	(2005),	the	model	overestimates	the	cost	of	object–gap	filling	for	object	relative	clauses.	The	prediction	following	from	the	model	is	that	adjusting	the	latency,	a	standard	ACT–R	parameter	that	influences	the	time	it	takes	to	perform	a	chunk	retrieval,	would	reduce	the	difference	between	model	and	data.	Thus,	the	prediction	is	that	the	retrieval	latency	of	 chunks	 may	 be	 lower	 in	 this	 type	 of	 language	 processing	 than	 in	 other	 cognitive	processes.		
Linguistic	principles	X–bar	 theory	 is	 a	 widely	 known	 approach	 to	 syntactic	 structure.	 Although	 already	previously	 implemented	 as	 an	 LC	 parser	 (Aho	 &	 Ullman,	 1972),	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	examine	this	linguistic	approach	in	interaction	with	memory	functions.	Importantly,	the	
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use	of	LC	parsing	allowed	the	L&V	model	to	use	top–down	(prediction–based)	as	well	as	bottom–up	(input–based)	processing,	which	increases	its	efficiency.			
Cognitive	principles	Many	of	the	cognitive	principles	used	in	the	L&V	model	are	taken	directly	from	ACT–R:	memory	retrievals	are	done	from	declarative	memory	and	the	grammatical	knowledge	needed	for	parsing	is	incorporated	in	production	rules.	Memory	plays	a	very	important	role	 in	 the	model,	as	processing	sentences	requires	memory	of	 the	recent	past.	For	all	memory	 functions,	 the	 same	 principles	 of	 declarative	 memory	 are	 used	 as	 would	 be	used	for	non–linguistic	processes.	For	the	L&V	model,	the	standard	ACT–R	architecture	was	expanded	with	a	lexical	buffer,	which	holds	a	lexical	chunk	after	it	is	retrieved	from	the	declarative	memory.	Thus,	the	model	assumes	the	use	of	general	memory	functions	for	 language	 processing,	 but	 adds	 a	 specific	 attention	 component	 to	 store	 linguistic	(lexical)	information	that	is	in	the	focus	of	attention.		 The	 speed	 of	 processing	 required	 for	 language	 processing	 is	 achieved	 in	 the	 L&V	model	by	keeping	the	model’s	processing	down	to	the	most	efficient	way	to	do	things:	processing	 a	 word	 takes	 a	 maximum	 of	 three	 production	 rules	 and	 two	 memory	retrievals.	This,	however,	 includes	only	 the	syntactic	processing,	 and	not,	 for	example,	any	semantic	processing.	It	remains	to	be	investigated	therefore	how	the	model	would	function	if	more	language	processing	elements,	that	take	time	to	be	executed,	are	added.			
Limitations	and	future	directions	Although	 the	 simulations	 show	 a	 decent	 fit	 when	 compared	 to	 data	 from	 several	empirical	 experiments,	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 phenomena	 for	which	 a	 discrepancy	 is	found	between	the	simulation	data	and	some	of	the	experimental	data.	Specifically,	the	L&V	 model	 overestimates	 effects	 of	 the	 length	 of	 a	 sentence	 and	 underestimates	interference	 effects.	 Lewis	 and	 Vasishth	 (2005)	 indicate	 that	 part	 of	 this	 discrepancy	may	be	resolved	by	giving	more	weight	to	decay	and	less	weight	to	interference	in	the	model,	but	leave	the	mechanisms	responsible	for	length	effects	and	interference	effects	open	for	future	research.		 Lewis	 and	 Vasishth	 (2005)	 acknowledge	 that	 the	model	 is	 a	 first	 step	 to	modeling	complete	sentence	comprehension,	and	indicate	that	 future	extensions	might	 lie	 in	the	fields	 of	 semantic	 and	 discourse	 processing,	 the	 interaction	 between	 lexical	 and	syntactic	 processing,	 and	 investigating	 individual	 performance	 based	 on	 working	memory	 capacity	 differences.	 Indeed,	 this	 sentence	 processing	model	 is	 an	 influential	model	that	has	served	as	a	building	block	for	further	research.	For	example,	Engelmann	et	al.	(2013)	use	the	sentence	processing	model	to	study	the	relation	between	syntactic	processing	 and	 eye	 movements,	 Salvucci	 and	 Taatgen	 (2008)	 use	 the	 model	 in	 their	research	of	multitasking,	and	Van	Rij	et	al.	(2010)	and	Vogelzang,	Guasti,	Van	Rijn,	and	Hendriks	 (in	 prep.;	 see	 also	 Chapter	 5	 of	 this	 dissertation)	 build	 their	 OT	 model	 of	pronoun	resolution	on	top	of	L&V’s	syntactic	processing	model.		
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2	2.4.2 	Modeling	syntactic	priming	in	language	production		A	 second	model	discussed	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 the	ACT–R	model	of	Reitter	 et	 al.	 (2011).	Their	model	 (henceforth	 the	RK&M	model)	 investigates	 syntactic	 priming	 in	 language	production.	Speakers	have	a	choice	between	different	words	and	grammatical	structures	to	 express	 their	 ideas.	 They	 tend	 to	 repeat	 previously	 encountered	 grammatical	structures,	a	pattern	of	 linguistic	behavior	 that	 is	referred	to	as	syntactic	or	structural	priming	 (for	 a	 review,	 see	 Pickering	 and	 Ferreira,	 2008).	 For	 example,	 Bock	 (1986)	found	that	when	speakers	were	presented	with	a	passive	construction	such	as	The	boy	
was	kissed	by	the	girl	as	a	description	of	a	picture,	 they	were	more	likely	to	describe	a	new	picture	using	 a	 similar	 syntactic	 structure.	 Effects	 of	 priming	have	been	detected	with	 a	 range	 of	 syntactic	 constructions,	 including	 noun	 phrase	 variants	 (Cleland	 &	Pickering,	 2003),	 the	 order	 of	 main	 and	 auxiliary	 verbs	 (Hartsuiker	 &	 Westenberg,	2000),	and	other	structures,	in	a	variety	of	languages	(Pickering	&	Ferreira,	2008),	and	in	 children	 (Huttenlocher,	 Vasilyeva,	 &	 Shimpi,	 2004;	 Van	 Beijsterveldt	 &	 Van	 Hell,	2009),	 but	 also	 syntactic	 phrase–structure	 rules	 in	 general	 (Reitter	 &	 Moore,	 2014;	Reitter,	Moore,	&	Keller,	2006).		In	the	literature,	a	number	of	factors	that	interact	with	priming	have	been	identified:	
• Cumulativity:	 priming	 strengthens	 with	 each	 copy	 of	 the	 primed	 construction	(Jaeger	&	Snider,	2008).	
• Decay:	the	probability	of	occurrence	of	a	syntactic	construction	decays	over	time	(Branigan,	Pickering,	&	Cleland,	1999).	
• Lexical	 boost:	 lexically	 similar	 materials	 increase	 the	 chance	 that	 priming	 will	occur	(Pickering	&	Branigan,	1998).	
• Inverse	frequency	interaction:	priming	by	less	frequent	constructions	is	stronger	(Scheepers,	2003).		Besides	 these	 factors,	 differences	 have	 been	 found	 between	 fast,	 short–term	 priming	and	slow,	long–term	adaptation,	which	is	a	learning	effect	that	can	persist	over	several	days	(Bock,	Dell,	Chang,	&	Onishi,	2007;	Kaschak,	Kutta,	&	Schatschneider,	2011).	These	two	 different	 priming	 effects	 have	 been	 suggested	 to	 use	 separate	 underlying	mechanisms	(Hartsuiker,	Bernolet,	Schoonbaert,	Speybroeck,	&	Vanderelst,	2008),	and	as	such	may	rely	on	different	cognitive	resources.			 Syntactic	 priming	 is	 seen	 as	 an	 important	 effect	 by	 which	 to	 validate	 models	 of	syntactic	 representations	 and	 associated	 learning.	 Several	 other	 models	 of	 syntactic	priming	were	proposed	(Chang,	Dell,	&	Bock,	2006;	Malhotra,	2009;	Snider,	2008),	but	none	of	these	are	able	to	account	for	all	mentioned	factors	as	well	as	short	and	long	term	priming.	The	goal	of	the	RK&M	model	is	thus	to	account	for	all	types	of	syntactic	priming	within	a	cognitive	architecture.		
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2.4.2.1 Theoretical	approach	The	RK&M	model	is	based	on	a	theoretical	approach	that	explains	priming	as	facilitation	of	 lexical–syntactic	 access.	 The	 model	 bases	 its	 syntactic	 composition	 process	 on	 a	broad–coverage	grammar	framework,	Combinatory	Categorial	Grammar	(CCG,	see	also	Section	2.3,	Steedman,	1988,	2000).	Categorial	Grammars	use	a	small	set	of	combinatory	rules	 and	 a	 set	 of	 parameters	 to	 define	 the	 basic	 operations	 that	 yield	 sentences	 in	 a	specific	language.	Most	specific	information	is	stored	in	the	lexicon.	With	the	use	of	CCG,	the	 RK&M	 model	 implements	 the	 idea	 of	 combinatorial	 categories	 as	 in	 Pickering	 &	Branigan’s	(1998)	model.		 In	 CCG,	 the	 syntactic	 process	 is	 the	 result	 of	 combinations	 of	 adjacent	 words	 and	phrases	 (in	 constituents).	 Unlike	 classical	 phrase–structure	 trees,	 however,	 the	categories	 that	 classify	 each	 constituent	 reflect	 its	 syntactic	 and	 semantic	 status	 by	stating	what	other	components	are	needed	before	a	sentence	results.	For	example,	the	phrase	loves	toys	needs	to	be	combined	with	a	noun	phrase	(NP)	to	its	left.	This	phrase	is	assigned	the	category	S\NP.	Similarly,	the	phrase	Dogs	love	requires	a	noun	phrase	to	its	right	to	be	complete,	thus,	its	category	is	S//NP.	Many	analyses	(derivations)	of	a	given	sentence	are	possible	in	CCG.			 CCG	allows	 the	RK&M	model	 to	 generate	 a	 syntactic	 construction	 incrementally,	 so	that	a	speaker	can	start	speaking	before	the	entire	sentence	is	planned.	However,	it	also	allows	the	planning	of	a	full	sentence	before	a	speaker	starts	speaking.	CCG	is	generally	underspecified	 and	 generates	 more	 sentences	 than	 would	 be	 judged	 acceptable.	 The	RK&M	model	at	 least	partially	addresses	 this	over–generation	by	employing	memory–based	ACT–R	mechanisms,	which	also	help	in	providing	a	cognitively	plausible	version	of	a	language	model.		
2.4.2.2 Implementation	In	 the	 RK&M	 model,	 lexical	 forms	 and	 syntactic	 categories	 are	 stored	 in	 chunks	 in	declarative	memory.	The	activation	of	 any	 chunk	 in	ACT–R	 is	determined	by	previous	occurrences,	 which	 causes	 previously	 used,	 highly	 active	 chunks	 to	 have	 a	 higher	retrieval	probability,	creating	a	priming	effect.			 The	RK&M	model	additionally	uses	spreading	activation	to	activate	all	syntax	chunks	that	are	associated	with	a	lexical	form,	creating	the	possibility	to	express	a	meaning	in	multiple	ways.	Some	ways	of	expressing	a	meaning	are	more	frequent	in	language	than	others,	and	therefore	the	amount	of	spreading	activation	from	a	lexical	form	to	a	syntax	chunk	 is	 mediated	 by	 the	 frequency	 of	 the	 syntactic	 construction.	 This	 causes	 more	frequent	forms	to	have	a	higher	activation	and	therefore	to	be	more	likely	to	be	selected.	However,	a	speaker’s	choice	of	syntactic	construction	can	vary	on	the	basis	of	priming	and	noise.		 To	 make	 its	 theoretical	 commitments	 to	 cue–based,	 frequency–	 and	 recency–governed	declarative	 retrieval,	 as	well	 as	 its	 non–commitments	 to	 specific	 production	rules	and	their	timing	more	clear,	the	RK&M	model	was	implemented	first	in	ACT–R	6,	and	then	in	the	ACT–UP	implementation	of	the	ACT–R	theory	(Reitter	&	Lebiere,	2010).		
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2	Syntactic	realization	The	 RK&M	model	 takes	 a	 semantic	 description	 of	 a	 sentence	 as	 input,	 and	 creates	 a	syntactic	structure	for	this	input.	The	processing	steps	of	the	model	are	shown	in	Figure	2.5	and	will	be	explained	on	the	basis	of	the	example	input	sharks	bite.	First,	the	model	retrieves	a	lexical	form	for	the	head	of	the	sentence	(Box	1).	In	our	example,	this	head	will	be	the	verb	bite.	Then	the	most	active	thematic	role	is	retrieved	from	memory	(Box	2),	 which	 would	 be	 the	 ‘agent–role’	 in	 our	 example.	 If	 no	 next	 thematic	 role	 can	 be	retrieved,	the	entire	sentence	has	been	generated	and	an	output	can	be	given.	The	model	then	identifies	the	argument	associated	with	the	retrieved	thematic	role,	and	retrieves	a	lexical	form	for	this	argument	(Box	3).	In	the	case	of	the	agent–role,	this	will	be	sharks.	Following,	 the	 model	 retrieves	 a	 syntax	 chunk	 that	 is	 associated	 with	 the	 retrieved	lexical	 form	(Box	4).	The	 lexical	 form	was	sharks,	and	the	corresponding	syntax	chunk	will	thus	indicate	that	this	is	an	NP,	and	that	it	needs	a	verb	to	its	right	(S/VP).	Finally,	the	model	adjoins	the	new	piece	of	syntactic	information	with	the	syntactic	structure	of	the	phrase	thus	far	(Box	5),	according	to	the	combinatorial	rules	of	CCG.	The	model	then	goes	back	to	retrieving	the	next	thematic	role	(Box	2),	and	repeats	this	process	until	the	entire	sentence	has	been	generated.	
	
Figure	2.5.	Overview	of	the	processing	steps	of	RK&M’s	syntactic	priming	model,	which	produces	 a	 syntactic	 structure	 of	 a	 sentence	 (based	 on	 Reitter	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 First,	retrievals	of	the	lexical	form	of	the	head	and	a	thematic	role	are	done.	Then,	the	model	selects	an	argument	for	the	thematic	role	and	retrieves	a	syntax	chunk	before	combining	the	information	according	to	combinatorial	rules	of	CCG	in	the	adjoin	phase.		
Priming	Within	the	language	production	process,	syntactic	choice	points	(Figure	2.5,	Box	4)	will	occur,	during	which	a	speaker	decides	between	several	possible	syntactic	variants.	The	model	 needs	 to	 explicate	 the	 probability	 distribution	 over	 possible	 decisions	 at	 that	point.	This	can	be	influenced	by	priming.		The	time	course	of	priming	is	of	concern	in	the	RK&M	model.	Immediately	after	a	prime,	repetition	 probability	 is	 strongly	 elevated.	 The	 model	 uses	 two	 default	 ACT–R	mechanisms,	 base–level	 learning	 and	 spreading	 activation,	 to	 account	 for	 long–term	adaptation	and	short–term	priming.	Short–term	priming	emerges	from	a	combination	of	two	general	memory	effects:	(1)	rapid	temporal	decay	of	syntactic	information,	and	(2)	cue–based	memory	retrieval	subject	to	interfering	and	facilitating	semantic	information	
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(Reitter	et	al.,	2011).	Long–term	priming	effects	in	the	model	emerge	from	the	increase	in	base–level	activation	that	occurs	when	a	chunk	is	retrieved.		
2.4.2.3 Evaluation	In	the	RK&M	model,	base–level	learning	and	spreading	activation	account	for	long–term	adaptation	 and	 short–term	 priming,	 respectively.	 By	 simulating	 a	 restricted	 form	 of	incremental	 language	production,	 it	 accounts	 for	 (a)	 the	 inverse	 frequency	 interaction	(Jaeger	&	Snider,	2013;	Reitter,	2008;	Scheepers,	2003);	 (b)	 the	absence	of	 a	decay	 in	long–term	 priming	 (Bock	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 Bock	 &	 Griffin,	 2000;	 Branigan,	 Pickering,	Steweart,	&	McLean,	2000;	Hartsuiker	&	Kolk,	1998);	and	(c)	the	cumulativity	of	 long–term	 adaptation	 (Jaeger	 &	 Snider,	 2007;	 Kaschak,	 Kutta,	 &	 Jones,	 2011).	 The	 RK&M	model	also	explains	the	lexical	boost	effect	and	the	fact	that	it	only	applies	to	short–term	priming,	 because	 semantic	 information	 is	held	 in	 short–term	memory	and	 serves	 as	 a	source	of	activation	for	associated	syntactic	material.		 The	model	 uses	 lexical–syntactic	 associations	 as	 in	 the	 residual–activation	 account	(Pickering	 &	 Branigan,	 1998).	 However,	 learning	 remains	 an	 implicit	 process,	 and	routinization	 (acquisition	 of	 highly	 trained	 sequences	 of	 actions)	may	 still	 occur,	 as	 it	would	in	implicit	learning	accounts.		 The	RK&M	model	 accounts	 for	 a	 range	of	 priming	 effects,	 but	despite	providing	 an	account	of	grammatical	encoding,	it	has	not	been	implemented	to	explain	how	speakers	construct	complex	sentences	using	the	broad	range	of	syntactic	constructions	found	in	a	corpus.		
Predictions	Because	semantic	 information	is	held	in	short–term	memory	and	serves	as	a	source	of	activation	for	associated	syntactic	material,	the	RK&M	model	predicts	that	lexical	boost	occurs	with	the	repetition	of	any	lexical	material	with	semantic	content,	rather	than	just	with	repeated	head	words.	This	prediction	was	confirmed	with	corpus	data	(Reitter	et	al.,	2011)	and	also	experimentally	(Scheepers,	Raffray,	&	Myachykov,	2017).	The	RK&M	model	also	predicts	that	only	content	words	cause	a	lexical	boost	effect.	This	prediction	was	not	tested	on	the	corpus,	although	it	is	compatible	with	prior	experimental	results	using	 content	words	 (Corley	&	 Scheepers,	 2002;	 Kootstra,	 Van	Hell,	 &	Dijkstra,	 2012;	Schoonbaert,	Hartsuiker,	&	Pickering,	2007)	and	semantically	related	words	(Cleland	&	Pickering,	2003),	and	the	insensitivity	of	priming	to	closed–class	words	(Bock	&	Kroch,	1989;	Ferreira,	2003;	Pickering	&	Branigan,	1998).		 The	model	predicted	cumulativity	of	prepositional–object	construction	priming,	and	it	 suggested	 that	 double–object	 constructions	 are	 ineffective	 as	 primes	 to	 the	 point	where	 cumulativity	 cannot	 be	 detected.	 In	 an	 experimental	 study	 published	 later	 by	another	lab	(Kaschak,	Kutta,	&	Jones,	2011),	this	turned	out	to	be	the	case.		
Linguistic	principles	An	 important	aspect	of	 the	RK&M	model	 is	 that	 it	uses	CCG.	This	 allows	 the	model	 to	realize	 syntactic	 constructions	 both	 incrementally	 and	 non–incrementally,	 without	
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2	storing	large	amounts	of	information.	CCG	can	produce	multiple	representations	of	the	input	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 which	 reflect	 the	 choices	 that	 a	 speaker	 can	 make.	 CCG	 has	enjoyed	substantial	use	on	 large–scale	problems	 in	computational	 linguistics	 in	 recent	years.	 Still,	 how	 much	 does	 this	 theoretical	 commitment	 (of	 CCG)	 limit	 the	 model’s	applicability?	The	RK&M	model	 relies,	 for	 its	account	of	grammatical	encoding,	on	 the	principles	of	incremental	planning	made	possible	by	categorial	grammars.	However,	for	its	account	of	syntactic	priming,	the	deciding	principle	is	that	the	grammar	is	lexicalized,	and	 that	 syntactic	 decisions	 involve	 lower–frequency	 constructions	 that	 are	 retrieved	from	declarative	(lexical)	memory.	Of	course,	ACT–R	as	a	cognitive	framework	imposes	demands	 on	 what	 the	 grammatical	 encoder	 can	 and	 cannot	 do,	 chiefly	 in	 terms	 of	working	memory:	 large,	 complex	 symbolic	 representations	 such	as	 those	necessary	 to	process	 subtrees	 in	 Tree–Adjoining	 Grammar	 (Joshi	 et	 al.,	 1975),	 or	 large	 feature	structures	 of	 unification–based	 formalisms	 such	 as	 Head–driven	 Phrase	 Structure	Grammar	(Pollard	&	Sag,	1994)	would	be	implausible	under	the	assumptions	of	ACT–R.		
Cognitive	principles	The	 RK&M	 model’s	 linguistic	 principles	 are	 intertwined	 with	 cognitive	 principles	 in	order	 to	explain	priming	effects.	Declarative	memory	retrievals	and	the	accompanying	activation	boost	 cause	 frequently	used	constructions	 to	be	preferred.	Additionally,	 the	model	 uses	 the	 default	 ACT–R	 component	 of	 spreading	 activation	 to	 give	 additional	activation	 to	 certain	 syntax	 chunks,	 increasing	 the	 likelihood	 that	 a	 specific	 syntactic	structure	will	be	used.	Working	memory	capacity	is	not	specified	in	the	RK&M	model.		 The	 RK&M	 model	 is	 silent	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 its	 grammatical	encoding	 algorithms.	 Standard	 ACT–R	 provides	 for	 production	 rules	 that	 represent	routinized	skills.	These	rules	are	executed	at	a	rate	of	one	every	50ms.	Whether	that	is	fast	enough	for	grammatical	encoding,	and	how	production	compilation	can	account	for	fast	processing,	is	unclear	at	this	time.	Production	compilation,	in	ACT–R,	can	combine	a	sequence	of	rule	invocations	and	declarative	retrievals	into	a	single,	 large	and	efficient	production	 rule.	 An	 alternative	 explanation	 may	 be	 that	 the	 production	 rule	 system	associated	with	the	syntactic	process	is	not	implemented	by	the	basal	ganglia,	the	brain	structure	normally	associated	with	ACT–R’s	production	rules,	but	by	a	language–specific	region	 such	 as	 Broca’s	 area.	 This	 language–specific	 region	 may	 allow	 for	 faster	processing.		
Limitations	and	future	directions	Some	effects	related	to	syntactic	priming	remain	unexplained	by	the	RK&M	model.	For	example,	 the	 repetition	 of	 thematic	 and	 semantic	 assignments	 between	 sentences	(Chang,	 Bock,	&	Goldberg,	 2003)	 is	 not	 a	 consequence	 of	 retrieval	 of	 lexical–syntactic	material.	A	future	ACT–R	model	can	make	use	of	working	memory	accounts	(cf.	Van	Rij	et	al.,	2013)	to	explain	repetition	preferences	leading	to	such	effects.		 	
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2.4.3 Modeling	the	acquisition	of	object	pronouns		The	 third	 and	 final	 model	 that	 is	 discussed,	 is	 Van	 Rij	 et	 al.’s	 (2010)	 model	 for	 the	acquisition	 of	 the	 interpretation	 of	 object	 pronouns	 (henceforth	 the	 RR&H	model).	 In	languages	 such	 as	 English	 and	Dutch,	 an	 object	 pronoun	 (him	 in	 Example	 2.1)	 cannot	refer	to	the	local	subject	(the	penguin	in	Example	2.1,	cf.	e.g.,	Chomsky,	1981).	Instead,	it	must	 refer	 to	 another	 referent	 in	 the	 context,	 in	 our	 example	 the	 sheep.	 In	 contrast,	reflexives	such	as	zichzelf	(‘himself’,	‘herself’)	can	only	refer	to	the	local	subject.		(2.1)	Kijk,	een	pinguïn	en	een	schaap.	De	pinguïn	slaat	hem/zichzelf.		 	Look,	a	penguin	and	a	sheep.	The	penguin	is	hitting	him/himself.		Children	up	 to	 age	7	 allow	 the	unacceptable	 interpretation	of	 the	object	pronoun	him	(the	penguin),	 although	 children	perform	adult–like	on	 the	 interpretation	of	 reflexives	from	the	age	of	4	(e.g.,	Chien	&	Wexler,	1990;	Philip	&	Coopmans,	1996).	Interestingly,	children	 as	 early	 as	 4	 years	 old	 show	 adult–like	 production	 of	 object	 pronouns	 and	reflexives	(e.g.,	De	Villiers,	Cahillane,	&	Altreuter,	2006;	Spenader	et	al.,	2009).	The	ACT–R	 model	 is	 used	 to	 investigate	 why	 children	 show	 difficulties	 interpreting	 object	pronouns,	but	not	interpreting	reflexives	or	producing	object	pronouns	or	reflexives.		
2.4.3.1 Theoretical	account	To	 explain	 the	 described	 findings	 on	 the	 interpretation	 of	 object	 pronouns	 and	reflexives,	 Hendriks	 and	 Spenader	 (2006)	 proposed	 that	 children	 do	 not	 lack	 the	linguistic	 knowledge	 needed	 for	 object	 pronoun	 interpretation,	 but	 fail	 to	 take	 into	account	 the	 speaker’s	 perspective.	 According	 to	 this	 account,	 formulated	 within	Optimality	Theory	(OT,	Prince	&	Smolensky,	1993,	see	also	Section	2.3),	object	pronouns	compete	with	reflexives	in	their	use	and	interpretation.			 In	the	account	of	Hendriks	and	Spenader	(2006),	two	grammatical	constraints	guide	the	 production	 and	 interpretation	 of	 pronouns	 and	 reflexives.	 ‘Principle	 A’	 is	 the	strongest	constraint,	which	states	that	reflexives	have	the	same	reference	as	the	subject	of	 the	 clause.	 In	 production,	 Hendriks	 and	 Spenader	 assume	 a	 general	 preference	 for	producing	 reflexives	 over	 pronouns,	 which	 is	 formulated	 in	 the	 constraint	 ‘Avoid	Pronouns’.			 Hendriks	and	Spenader	(2006)	argue	that	the	interpretation	of	object	pronouns	is	not	ambiguous	 for	 adults,	 because	 they	 take	 into	 account	 the	 speakers’	 perspective:	 if	 the	speaker	wanted	to	refer	to	the	subject	(e.g.,	the	penguin	in	Sentence	1),	then	the	speaker	would	 have	 used	 a	 reflexive	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 constraint	 Principle	 A.	When	 the	speaker	did	not	use	a	reflexive,	 therefore,	an	adult	 listener	should	be	able	 to	conclude	that	 the	speaker	must	have	wanted	to	refer	to	another	referent.	Although	this	account	can	 explain	 the	 asymmetry	 in	 children’s	 production	 and	 interpretation	 of	 object	pronouns,	 it	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 theory	 on	 how	 children	 acquire	 the	 interpretation	 of	object	pronouns.	To	 investigate	 this	question,	 the	 theoretical	 account	of	Hendriks	 and	
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2	Spenader	 was	 implemented	 in	 ACT–R	 (Van	 Rij	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 see	 also	 Hendriks	 et	 al.,	2007).		2.4.3.2 Implementation	An	overview	of	 the	RR&H	model	 is	presented	 in	Figure	2.6.	The	process	of	 finding	the	optimal	 meaning	 for	 a	 form	 (in	 comprehension)	 or	 finding	 the	 optimal	 form	 for	 a	meaning	(in	production)	was	implemented	in	ACT–R	as	a	serial	process.	To	illustrate	the	process,	consider	the	interpretation	of	the	pronoun	him.	
	
Figure	2.6.	The	optimization	process	as	implemented	in	the	RR&H	model	to	determine	the	optimal	meaning	for	a	form	(in	comprehension),	and	the	optimal	form	for	a	meaning	(in	production,	based	on	Van	Rij	et	al.,	2010).		
Using	grammatical	constraints	When	interpreting	a	pronoun,	two	consecutive	production	rules	request	the	retrieval	of	two	candidate	interpretations	from	the	model’s	declarative	memory	(Box	1	and	Box	2	in	Figure	2.6).	The	two	candidate	interpretations	are	the	co–referential	interpretation	(i.e.,	reference	to	the	referent	expressed	by	the	local	subject,	e.g.	the	penguin	in	Sentence	1)	and	the	disjoint	interpretation	(i.e.,	reference	to	another	referent	in	the	discourse,	such	as	the	sheep	 in	Sentence	1).	Consequently,	a	production	rule	requests	the	retrieval	of	a	grammatical	 constraint	 from	 declarative	 memory.	 The	 chunk	 that	 represents	 the	constraint	Principle	A	has	 the	highest	activation	because	 it	 is	 the	strongest	constraint,	and	is	retrieved	from	memory	first	(see	Box	3).			 On	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 retrieved	 constraint,	 the	 two	 candidate	 interpretations	 are	evaluated	(Box	4	and	5).	If	one	of	the	candidates	violates	the	constraint,	the	RR&H	model	tries	to	replace	that	candidate	by	a	new	candidate	(Box	4	and	Box	2).	If	it	cannot	find	a	new	 candidate	 in	 memory,	 the	 remaining	 candidate	 is	 selected	 as	 the	 optimal	interpretation.			 If	 the	 input	was	a	pronoun,	however,	none	of	 the	candidate	 interpretations	violates	Principle	A.	Therefore,	both	candidate	 interpretations	are	still	possible	(Box	5).	 In	this	situation	 the	 RR&H	 model	 retrieves	 a	 new	 constraint	 (Box	 3),	 Avoid	 Pronouns.	 This	constraint	 cannot	 distinguish	 between	 the	 two	 candidate	meanings	 either,	 because	 it	
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only	applies	to	forms.	As	both	the	co–referential	and	the	disjoint	interpretation	are	still	possible,	 the	 model	 randomly	 selects	 one	 of	 the	 two	 candidates	 as	 the	 optimal	interpretation.	The	 random	choice	between	 two	optimal	 candidates	 reflects	 children’s	behavior	in	the	interpretation	of	object	pronouns.			
Perspective	taking	After	 selecting	 the	 optimal	 interpretation,	 the	 RR&H	 model	 takes	 the	 speaker’s	perspective	 to	 verify	 whether	 the	 speaker	 indeed	 intended	 to	 express	 the	 selected	interpretation	 (see	 Figure	 2.7).	 Taking	 the	 speaker’s	 perspective,	 the	 model	 uses	 the	same	 optimization	 mechanism,	 but	 now	 the	 input	 is	 the	 meaning	 (optimal	interpretation)	selected	in	the	previous	step	when	taking	the	listener’s	perspective	(m1),	and	the	output	is	the	optimal	form	to	express	that	meaning	(f2).		
	
Figure	2.7.	An	optimization	process	 from	the	perspective	of	 the	 listener	as	well	as	an	optimization	process	from	the	perspective	of	the	speaker	is	performed	(based	on	Van	Rij	et	al.,	2010).		Continuing	 with	 the	 example	 of	 processing	 an	 object	 pronoun,	 the	model	 could	 have	selected	 the	 co–referential	 interpretation	 as	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 object	 pronoun	when	 taking	 the	 listener’s	perspective.	 In	 that	 situation,	 the	 input	 (m1)	 for	 the	 second	optimization	 step,	 using	 the	 speaker’s	 perspective,	 would	 be	 the	 co–referential	interpretation.	 The	 output	 of	 the	 second	 optimization	 step	 (f2)	 is	 the	 reflexive	 form,	because	the	constraint	Avoid	Pronouns	favors	the	use	of	a	reflexive	over	a	pronoun.			 After	the	two	optimization	steps,	a	new	production	rule	fires	that	compares	the	initial	input	(the	object	pronoun)	with	the	output	(a	reflexive,	Figure	2.7	Box	3).	As	these	forms	are	 not	 identical	 in	 our	 example,	 the	 model	 concludes	 that	 a	 co–referential	interpretation	is	not	intended	by	the	speaker:	the	speaker	would	have	used	a	reflexive	rather	than	a	pronoun	to	express	a	co–referential	interpretation.	As	a	consequence,	the	model	will	take	an	alternative	candidate	interpretation,	the	disjoint	interpretation,	and	will	check	if	the	speaker	could	have	intended	a	disjoint	interpretation.		 Alternatively,	if	the	model	had	selected	a	disjoint	interpretation	for	a	pronoun	during	the	 first	 optimization	 step,	 the	 input	 for	 the	 speaker’s	 perspective	 (m1)	 would	 be	 a	disjoint	 interpretation.	 The	 constraint	 Principle	 A	 would	 cause	 the	 model	 to	 select	 a	pronoun	 rather	 than	 a	 reflexive	 for	 expressing	 the	 disjoint	 interpretation	 (f2).	 As	 the	original	input	(f1,	a	pronoun)	and	the	output	(f2,	also	a	pronoun)	are	identical,	the	model	concludes	that	the	speaker	indeed	intended	a	disjoint	interpretation.		 Although	 children	 are	 expected	 to	 use	 the	 same	 perspective	 taking	 mechanism	 as	adults,	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 their	 processing	 is	 too	 slow	 up	 to	 age	 7	 to	 complete	 this	
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2	process.	 The	 time	 for	 pronoun	 resolution	 is	 limited:	When	 the	 next	 word	 comes,	 the	model	 stops	 processing	 the	 pronoun	 and	 redirects	 its	 attention	 to	 the	 new	 word.	Gradually	however,	children’s	processing	becomes	more	efficient	due	to	ACT–R’s	default	mechanism	 of	 production	 compilation	 (Taatgen	 &	 Anderson,	 2002).	 This	 way,	 the	process	becomes	more	efficient,	and	over	 time	 it	 is	possible	 to	 take	 the	perspective	of	the	speaker	into	account	in	interpretation.		
2.4.3.3 Evaluation	The	RR&H	model	 explains	 the	delay	 in	object	pronoun	acquisition	as	arising	 from	 the	interaction	between	general	cognitive	principles	and	specific	linguistic	constraints.	The	model	 simulations	 show	 that	 children’s	 non–adult–like	 performance	 does	 not	necessarily	 arise	 from	differences	 in	 linguistic	 knowledge	or	differences	 in	processing	mechanism,	but	may	arise	because	children	lack	processing	efficiency.			
Predictions	From	 the	 RR&H	model	 simulations,	 a	 new	 prediction	was	 formulated:	 when	 children	receive	 sufficient	 time	 for	 pronoun	 interpretation,	 they	 will	 show	 more	 adult–like	performance	 on	 object	 pronoun	 interpretation.	 Van	 Rij	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 tested	 this	prediction	by	slowing	down	the	speech	rate.	They	found	that	children	indeed	performed	significantly	 more	 adult–like	 on	 object	 pronoun	 interpretation	 when	 they	 were	presented	with	slowed–down	speech	compared	to	normal	speech.	A	second	prediction	of	 the	 RR&H	model	 is	 that	 the	 use	 of	 perspective	 taking	 in	 pronoun	 interpretation	 is	dependent	on	the	input	frequency	of	pronouns.	With	higher	input	frequency,	the	process	becomes	more	efficient	in	a	shorter	time	(Hendriks,	2014;	Van	Rij	et	al.,	2010).		
Linguistic	principles	The	 linguistic	 principles	 incorporated	 in	 the	 RR&H	 model	 is	 rooted	 in	 OT.	 The	underlying	 idea	 in	 OT	 is	 that	 an	 in	 principle	 infinite	 set	 of	 potential	 candidates	 is	evaluated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 all	 constraints	 of	 the	 grammar.	 The	 serial	 optimization	mechanism	 implemented	 in	 the	model	 is	 a	more	 constrained	 version	 of	 optimization:	the	 two	 most	 likely	 candidates	 are	 compared	 using	 the	 constraints	 that	 are	 most	relevant	in	the	context.	In	this	respect,	the	optimization	mechanism	could	be	applied	to	other	linguistic	(and	non–linguistic)	phenomena	and	is	thus	potentially	generalizable.		
Cognitive	principles	Several	 general	 cognitive	 principles	 are	 used	 in	 the	 RR&H	 model.	 Production	compilation	 learning	 allowed	 the	model	 to	 gradually	 derive	 an	 efficient	 variant	 of	 the	general	 cognitive	 skill	 of	 perspective	 taking	 that	 is	 specialized	 for	 object	 pronoun	interpretation.	This	specialization	mechanism	has	been	applied	to	model	other	linguistic	and	nonlinguistic	phenomena	(e.g.,	Taatgen	&	Anderson,	2002).	Through	the	increased	efficiency	of	production	rules,	as	well	as	through	increasing	activation	of	candidates	and	constraints	 that	 were	 used	 for	 pronoun	 interpretation,	 the	 model’s	 processing	 speed	increases	over	time.	
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	 The	RR&H	model	uses	ACT–R’s	declarative	memory	 for	 the	storage	and	retrieval	of	candidates	 and	 constraints.	 However,	 no	 discourse	 processing	 was	 included	 in	 the	model,	and	no	working	memory	component	was	used.	Therefore,	a	remaining	question	is	whether,	contrary	to	what	is	assumed	in	other	research	(Christiansen	&	Chater,	2016),	processing	 speed	 limitations	 on	 pronoun	 processing	 are	 not	 imposed	 by	 working	memory	limitations,	but	by	processing	efficiency	limitations	(cf.	Kuijper,	2016).		
Limitations	and	future	directions	A	potential	 limitation	of	RR&H’s	 object	 pronoun	processing	model	 is	 that	 it	 is	 not	 yet	clear	 how	 to	 determine	 the	 two	most	 likely	 candidates,	 or	 how	 the	model	 can	 decide	what	 the	 most	 relevant	 constraint	 is.	 Another	 simplification	 is	 that	 both	 candidate	referents	 were	 introduced	 in	 the	 previous	 sentence.	 An	 interesting	 extension	 of	 the	model	would	be	one	in	which	the	discourse	status	of	the	referents	would	also	be	taken	into	 account	 (cf.	 Van	 Rij	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 The	 extended	 model	 would	 need	 to	 integrate	factors	 such	 as	 first–mention,	 frequency	 and	 recency	 to	 account	 for	 the	 discourse	prominence	 of	 referents,	 which	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 pronoun	 resolution	(Spenader	et	al.,	2009).			
2.5 Commonalities	and	differences		In	the	previous	sections	we	discussed	three	language	processing	models	in	ACT–R	that	were	based	on	different	linguistic	approaches.	The	models	were	all	implemented	in	the	same	 cognitive	 architecture,	 so	 they	 are	 all	 constrained	 by	 the	 same	 limitations	 on	cognitive	 resources.	 This	 allows	 for	 their	 comparison,	 even	 though	 they	 are	implementations	 of	 different	 linguistic	 phenomena.	 In	 this	 section	we	will	 discuss	 the	commonalities	 and	 differences	 between	 these	 models	 in	 more	 detail,	 so	 it	 can	 be	examined	 to	 which	 extent	 assumptions	 about	 general	 cognitive	 resources	 influence	implementations	of	these	specific	 linguistic	approaches.	Additionally,	 their	comparison	will	 provide	 an	 overview	 of	 some	 choices	 that	 can	 be	 made	 when	 implementing	 a	language	 processing	 model,	 such	 as	 how	 to	 represent	 (grammatical)	 knowledge,	 and	how	these	choices	can	directly	impact	how	cognitive	resources	influence	the	model.	The	models’	main	differences	lie	in	1)	the	language	modality,	2)	the	linguistic	approach	they	take,	and	3)	how	grammatical	knowledge	is	represented.		 As	for	the	different	language	modalities	investigated	in	the	three	models,	the	model	of	Lewis	and	Vasishth	(2005)	focuses	on	sentence	 interpretation	and	builds	the	syntactic	representations	needed	for	interpretation.	In	contrast,	the	model	of	Reitter	et	al.	(2011)	focuses	 on	 sentence	 production.	 The	model	 of	 Van	 Rij	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 again	 focuses	 on	sentence	 interpretation,	 but	 includes	 a	 sentence	 production	 component	 in	 its	implementation	 of	 perspective	 taking.	 So,	 the	 selected	 models	 show	 that	 cognitive	models	can	perform	both	sentence	processing	as	needed	for	interpretation	and	sentence	processing	 as	 needed	 for	 production.	 As	 the	 selected	 models	 are	 merely	 example	implementations	of	 linguistic	approaches,	 this	shows	how	versatile	cognitive	modeling	can	be.	
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2		 A	second	difference	between	the	three	models	is	that	the	models	all	take	a	different	linguistic	 approach,	 as	 Lewis	 and	 Vasishth	 (2005)	 used	 LC	 parsing	 based	 on	 X–bar	theory,	 Reitter	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 used	 CCG,	 and	 Van	 Rij	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 used	 OT.	 Although	 a	working	cognitive	model	does	not	prove	the	necessity	of	a	particular	linguistic	approach,	it	 shows	 its	 sufficiency:	 The	model	 of	 Lewis	 and	Vasishth	 (2005),	 for	 example,	 shows	that	LC	parsing	is	sufficient	to	account	for	experimental	data	on	sentence	processing.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	three	linguistic	approaches	need	not	be	mutually	exclusive.	For	example,	 it	 is	 conceivable	 that	 a	model	 processes	 sentences	based	on	LC	parsing,	 and	uses	OT	 to	 interpret	 ambiguous	pronouns	 (cf.	Van	Rij	 et	 al.,	 2013;	Vogelzang	 et	 al.,	 in	prep.;	 see	 also	Chapter	5	of	 this	dissertation).	Additionally,	 it	 should	be	noted	 that	 all	three	 theories	 have	 been	 treated	 as	 approaches	 that	 have	 remained	 unquestioned,	whereas	 variations	 of	 these	 approaches	 may	 be	 worth	 while	 to	 consider	 (cf.	 e.g.,	Osborne,	Putnam,	&	Gross,	2011).		 A	 final	 important	 difference	 between	 the	models	 is	 how	grammatical	 knowledge	 is	represented.	 In	 Lewis	 and	 Vasishth’s	 model	 (2005),	 lexical	 information	 and	 syntactic	structures	are	stored	in	declarative	memory,	but	grammatical	rules	are	incorporated	as	procedural	 knowledge	 in	 production	 rules.	 Therefore,	 their	 grammatical	 rules	 are	 not	subject	 to	 the	 activation	 functions	 associated	 with	 the	 declarative	 memory,	 but	 are	subject	 to	 the	 time	constraints	of	production	rule	execution.	This	 is	different	 from	the	model	of	Reitter	et	al.	(2011),	which	stores	lexical	forms	as	well	as	syntactic	categories	as	 chunks	 in	 the	 declarative	memory,	 and	 therefore	 also	 incorporate	 the	 grammatical	rules	 in	 the	 declarative	 memory.	 The	 model	 of	 Van	 Rij	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 incorporates	grammatical	 rules	 as	 chunks	 in	 the	 declarative	 memory.	 So,	 the	 models	 incorporate	grammatical	knowledge	in	different	ways,	which	has	consequences	for	the	influence	of	general	 cognitive	 resources	on	grammatical	knowledge.	Specifically,	knowledge	stored	in	declarative	memory	 is	 subject	 to	ACT–R’s	 principles	 concerning	memory	 activation	and	retrieval	time,	whereas	knowledge	stored	in	procedural	memory	is	subject	to	ACT–R’s	principles	concerning	production	rule	execution	time.		 Although	 the	 three	 models	 differ	 in	 several	 respects,	 they	 also	 have	 a	 number	 of	important	features	in	common.	The	most	important	ones	that	we	will	discuss	are	1)	the	restrictions	 placed	 on	 the	 model	 performance	 by	 general	 cognitive	 resources,	 2)	 the	assumption	 of	 a	 serial	 processing	 bottleneck,	 and	 3)	 the	 generation	 of	 quantitative	predictions.			 As	 all	 models	 were	 implemented	 in	 ACT–R,	 the	 performance	 of	 all	 models	 is	constrained	 by	 the	 same	 restrictions	 on	 cognitive	 resources.	 So,	 although	 the	models	focus	on	different	linguistic	phenomena	and	use	different	representations,	they	all	use,	for	 example,	 the	 same	 functions	 of	 declarative	 memory	 for	 the	 activation	 of	 chunks.	Furthermore,	 they	 all	 use	 the	 same	 distinction	 between	 procedural	 and	 declarative	memory,	and	 incorporate	 the	constraint	 that	 information	can	only	be	actively	used	by	the	 model	 once	 it	 is	 retrieved	 from	 declarative	 memory.	 Using	 the	 same	 cognitive	architecture	therefore	makes	these	different	models	comparable	with	regard	to	how	the	representations	are	influenced	by	cognitive	resources.	
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	 Another	constraint	within	all	the	models,	also	imposed	by	the	cognitive	architecture,	is	the	serial	processing	bottleneck	(Anderson,	2007).	In	ACT–R,	only	one	production	rule	execution	 or	 memory	 retrieval	 can	 be	 performed	 at	 a	 time.	 Using	 serial	 processing	increases	 the	 time	 it	 takes	 to	 perform	multiple	 processing	 steps.	 Therefore,	 the	 serial	processing	bottleneck	creates	timing	constraints	for	the	models,	influencing	predictions	about	performance.	We	will	discuss	the	implications	of	this	serial	processing	bottleneck	in	more	detail	in	the	Discussion	section.		 Finally,	the	last	commonality	is	that	all	models	can	generate	quantitative	predictions.	In	general,	linguistic	theories	only	discuss	competence,	and	do	not	address	performance	and	do	not	explain	why	the	observed	performance	may	not	match	the	competence.	Thus,	linguistic	theories	do	not	explain,	for	example,	why	speakers	may	use	a	certain	form	in	80%	of	 the	cases,	but	a	different	 form	 in	 the	other	cases.	By	 implementing	 theoretical	approaches	 in	cognitive	models,	quantitative	predictions	about	why	performance	does	not	match	competence	can	be	generated.		
2.6 Discussion		In	 this	 review	 we	 investigated	 to	 what	 extent	 general	 cognitive	 resources	 influence	concretely	implemented	models	of	linguistic	competence.	To	this	end,	we	examined	the	language	processing	models	of	Lewis	and	Vasishth	(2005),	Reitter	et	al.	(2011),	and	Van	Rij	 et	 al.	 (2010).	 In	 this	 section	we	will	discuss	 the	benefits	 and	 limitations	of	using	a	cognitive	 architecture	 to	 implement	 and	 investigate	 theories	 of	 linguistic	 competence,	and	 to	what	 extent	 general	 cognitive	 resources	 influence	performance	on	 the	basis	 of	these	theories.		 Cognitive	architectures	provide	a	 framework	for	 implementing	theories	of	 linguistic	competence	in	a	validated	account	of	general	cognitive	resources	related	to	learning	and	memory.	 The	 three	 specific	 models	 that	 we	 discussed	 showed	 that	 the	 cognitive	architecture	ACT–R	on	the	one	hand	provides	sufficient	freedom	to	implement	different	linguistic	 theories	 in	a	plausible	manner,	and	on	the	other	hand	sufficiently	constrains	these	 theories	 to	 account	 for	 several	 differences	 between	 linguistic	 competence	 and	performance.	Implementing	a	linguistic	theory	in	a	cognitive	architecture	forces	one	to	specify,	 among	 other	 things,	 assumptions	 about	 how	 lexical,	 syntactic,	 and	 semantic	knowledge	 is	 represented	 and	 processed	 in	 our	 mind.	 These	 specifications	 are	necessarily	 constrained	 by	 general	 cognitive	 resources.	 Therefore,	 general	 cognitive	resources	 such	 as	 memory	 and	 processing	 speed	 also	 constrain	 performance	 on	 the	basis	 of	 linguistic	 theories,	 and	 are	 crucial	 for	 investigating	 this	 performance	 in	 a	cognitively	plausible	framework.			 By	 implementing	 a	 theory	 of	 linguistic	 competence	 in	 a	 cognitive	model,	 it	 can	 be	evaluated	whether	a	 linguistic	 theory	 can	account	 for	experimental	performance	data.	The	 distinction	 between	 competence	 and	 performance	 is	 an	 advantage	 of	 cognitive	models	 over	 abstract	 linguistic	 theories	 (reflecting	 competence)	 and	 standard	experimental	measures	 (measuring	performance).	A	cognitive	model	 thus	can	be	used	not	only	to	model	performance,	but	also	to	investigate	the	reason	why	full	competence	
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2	may	not	be	reached	(e.g.,	because	of	memory	retrieval	 limitations:	Van	Maanen	&	Van	Rijn,	2010,	processing	speed	limitations:	Van	Rij	et	al.,	2010,	or	the	use	of	an	incorrect	strategy:	Arslan,	Taatgen,	&	Verbrugge,	2017).	As	such,	cognitive	models	can	account	for	patterns	 of	 linguistic	 performance	 that	were	 traditionally	 accounted	 for	 by	 positing	 a	separate	 parsing	 module	 in	 the	 mind	 specifically	 for	 language	 processing	 (Frazier	 &	Fodor,	 1978;	Kimball,	 1973).	All	 three	 cognitive	models	discussed	 in	 this	 review	have	been	applied	to	fit	human	data.	In	many	of	these	cases,	the	model	could	account	for	the	general	 trends	 in	 the	 data,	 if	 not	 the	 complete	 data	 set.	 As	 such,	 all	 three	 models	provided	 an	 explicit	 relation	 between	 data,	 theory,	 and	 explanation.	 Although	 not	 all	models	 made	 novel	 predictions	 that	 could	 be	 tested	 in	 new	 experiments,	 this	 is	 a	strength	 of	 cognitive	 modeling	 and	 therefore	 something	 every	 paper	 on	 cognitive	modeling	should	include.	Adding	novel	predictions	shows	that	1)	the	model	was	not	just	fitted	 to	 existing	data,	 and	2)	 the	model	 is	 falsifiable.	The	 latter	 is	 important,	 because	falsifiable	models	 allow	 a	 theory	 to	 be	 disproven.	 Providing	 novel	 predictions	 allows	other	 researchers	 to	 test	 these,	 and	 gather	 either	 support	 for	 or	 evidence	 against	 a	specific	theory.		 An	 additional	 benefit	 of	 cognitive	 modeling	 is	 that	 individual	 differences	 can	 be	investigated.	 By	 manipulating,	 for	 example,	 the	 amount	 of	 experience	 (Van	 Rij	 et	 al.,	2010),	 the	 amount	 of	 working	memory	 capacity	 (Van	 Rij	 et	 al.,	 2013),	 or	 the	 rate	 of	forgetting	in	memory	(Sense,	Behrens,	Meijer,	&	Van	Rijn,	2016),	different	performance	levels	 can	 be	 achieved.	 This	 way,	 different	 individuals	 can	 be	modeled	 and	 it	 can	 be	investigated	 why	 certain	 mistakes	 may	 be	 made	 (explanations	 could	 be,	 for	 example	limited	 experience,	 limited	 memory	 capacity,	 limited	 attention	 span).	 By	 combining	different	simulated	individuals,	group	effects	may	be	explained	(Van	Rij	et	al.,	2010).			 There	 are,	 however,	 also	 some	 limitations	 to	 modeling	 language	 processing	 in	 a	cognitive	 architecture.	 Firstly,	 all	 three	 models	 that	 were	 discussed	 can	 account	 for	specific	linguistic	phenomena,	but	these	only	form	a	small	part	of	language.	Scalability	is	an	 issue	 for	many	models,	 because	 expanding	 their	 coverage	 and	making	 them	more	complex	 (for	 example,	 by	 combining	 a	 model	 that	 performs	 full	 semantic	 processing	with	a	model	 that	performs	 full	 syntactic	processing)	will	make	models	 slower	 in	any	architecture	that	assumes	serial	processing.	It	is	thus	important	to	keep	in	mind	that	the	discussed,	 relatively	 small,	 serially	 implemented	models	 of	 language	 processing	were	sufficient	 to	 fit	 to	 experimental	 data,	 but	 it	 is	 unknown	how	 the	models	will	 perform	when	expanded.			 A	second	limitation	is	related	to	a	concern	that	Lewis	and	Vasishth	(2005)	raise:	the	degrees	of	freedom	in	cognitive	models.	For	any	set	of	cognitive	models	to	be	optimally	comparable,	 they	 should	 be	 restricted	 by	 the	 same	 cognitive	 resources.	 However,	cognitive	 architectures	 provide	 much	 freedom	 regarding	 different	 parameters	 (for	example,	the	memory	decay	parameter	in	ACT–R	can	be	changed	manually).	Therefore,	models	 should	generally	 strive	 to	keep	 the	quantitative	parameters	 constant.	 If	 this	 is	done,	 any	 variation	 between	models	will	 originate	 from	 the	 production	 rules	 and	 the	content	 of	 the	 declarative	 memory,	 which	 is	 also	 where	 (linguistic)	 theory	 is	implemented.	
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	 As	a	final	limitation,	any	cognitive	architecture	that	does	not	specify	different	types	of	memory	will	make	 it	 difficult	 to	model	 language	 processing	 in	 all	 its	 complexity.	 For	example,	long–term	memory	is	difficult	to	implement	in	ACT–R,	because	all	chunks	are	subject	to	the	same	decay	in	activation	over	time.	Thus,	it	is	a	puzzle	why	people	do	not	forget	certain	pieces	of	knowledge	that	are	not	retrieved	frequently	(like,	 for	example,	what	a	hedgehog	is).	Recent	research	has	found	that	different	types	of	facts	may	actually	have	 different	 decay	 rates	 (Sense	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 This	 can	 be	 important	 for	 language	processing,	because	even	infrequent	words	are	not	forgotten	and	can	still	be	recognized	and	used	after	a	long	time.	A	related	issue	is	that	cognitive	architectures	with	only	one	type	 of	 memory	 make	 it	 challenging	 to	 implement	 and	 manipulate	 working	 memory	capacity.	 So,	 although	 the	 possibility	 of	manipulating	 cognitive	 resources	 in	 cognitive	models	can	be	seen	as	a	benefit,	not	restricting	how	these	cognitive	resources	should	be	modeled	limits	their	application.	As	language	processing	is	known	to	be	constrained	by	working	memory	capacity,	manipulations	of	working	memory	capacity	would	be	useful	in	 order	 to	 study	 its	 effects	 on	 linguistic	 performance.	 Moreover,	 when	 modeling	language	acquisition	or	 language	attrition,	working	memory	may	be	of	great	 influence,	as	 it	 can	 differ	 between	 ages	 (Grivol	 &	 Hage,	 2011)	 and	 in	 clinical	 populations	 (e.g.,	ADHD:	 Martinussen,	 Hayden,	 Hogg–Johnson,	 &	 Tannock,	 2005;	 autism	 spectrum	disorder:	 Barendse	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 cochlear	 implant	 users:	 AuBuchon,	 Pisoni,	 &	Kronenberger,	 2015).	 Although	 the	 function	 of	 working	 memory	 can	 be	 simulated	indirectly	 through	 other	 processes	 like	 spreading	 activation	 (Daily	 et	 al.,	 2001),	restrictions	on	 their	 implementation	 in	 the	cognitive	architecture	would	make	models	more	comparable	and	potentially	more	cognitively	plausible.		 Thus,	using	a	cognitive	architecture	 to	 investigate	 theories	of	 linguistic	 competence	has	clear	benefits	as	well	as	a	number	of	current	limitations.	The	main	question	in	this	review	 was	 to	 what	 extent	 general	 cognitive	 resources	 influence	 concretely	implemented	models	of	linguistic	competence.	An	examination	of	the	different	cognitive	models	of	linguistic	performance	provides	evidence	that	well–studied	general	cognitive	resources	 such	 as	 working	 memory	 influence	 language	 processing.	 In	 addition,	 less	well–studied	cognitive	factors	may	also	play	a	role,	such	as	number	of	processing	steps	(Lewis	and	Vasishth,	2005)	and	processing	efficiency	(Van	Rij	et	al.,	2010).	The	influence	of	 these	 factors	 can	 differ	 due	 to	 differences	 in,	 for	 example,	 experience,	 processing	strategy,	 or	 possibly	 developmental	 disorder.	 Thus,	 our	 investigation	 of	 different	cognitive	models	 emphasizes	 that	 not	 only	memory–related	 resources,	 but	 also	 other	timing–related	resources	and	factors	influence	language	processing.		 As	 stated,	 implementations	 of	 linguistic	 theories	 into	 a	 cognitive	model	 can,	 on	 the	one	 hand,	 provide	 information	 about	 whether	 the	 theory	 can	 sufficiently	 account	 for	observed	performance.	On	the	other	hand,	they	can	also	be	used	to	investigate	cognitive	processes.	For	example,	 the	speed	of	 language	processing	 is	so	high	that	 it	may	not	be	met	 by	 the	 time–consuming	 processing	 steps	 provided	 by	 a	 cognitive	 model	 (cf.	Vogelzang	et	al.,	in	prep.;	see	also	Chapter	5	of	this	dissertation),	or	by	the	same	memory	processes	that	underlie	other	cognitive	processes.	So,	from	the	viewpoint	of	linguistics,	but	also	from	the	viewpoint	of	cognitive	modeling,	the	puzzle	of	highly	fast	and	efficient	
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2	language	processing	 compared	 to	other	 cognitive	processes	 is	 an	 interesting	direction	for	future	research.			 Overall,	 cognitively	 constrained	 models	 can	 be	 used	 to	 investigate	 whether	 a	linguistic	 theory	 can	 account	 for	 specific	 linguistic	 data.	 The	 interactions	 between	 a	particular	 linguistic	 approach	 and	 general	 cognitive	 resources	 can	 be	 investigated	through	 such	 models,	 which	 formalize	 of	 relation	 between	 competence	 and	performance.	Additionally,	cognitive	models	can	generate	quantitative	predictions	of	the	basis	of	theories	of	linguistic	competence.	Because	of	this,	cognitive	models	of	linguistic	theories	 are	 very	 suitable	 for	 investigating	 the	 relation	 between	 data,	 theory	 and	experiments.	 Moreover,	 the	 possibility	 to	 model	 differences	 in	 cognitive	 resources	allows	for	the	investigation	of	individual	differences	in	performance,	as	well	as	deviating	performance	due	to	aging	or	developmental	disorders.	In	some	cases,	the	high	efficiency	of	 language	 processing	 is	 currently	 not	met	 by	 some	 of	 the	 constraining	 assumptions	about	 cognitive	 resources.	 In	 this	 sense,	 cognitive	models	 of	 language	 processing	 can	also	 be	 used	 to	 investigate	 human	 cognition,	 for	 example	 in	 which	 ways	 currently	adopted	cognitive	assumptions	fail	to	meet	the	requirements	for	language	processing.	In	conclusion,	investigating	specific	linguistic	phenomena	through	cognitive	modeling	can	provide	 new	 insights	 that	 can	 complement	 findings	 from	 standard	 experimental	techniques.		

